In this talk, I will talk about my recent research result with Elaine Shi.
In short, in blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereums, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a ``dream'' transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed.
In this work, we prove a new impossibility result: assuming finite block size, no single-parameter, non-trivial, possibly randomized TFM can simultaneously satisfy truthful bidding and miner-user side contract proofness. On the other hand, we also give a relaxed version of the player's utility. In this case, we propose a mechanism that satisfies truthful bidding and miner-user side contract proofness.
Zoom Participation. See announcement. Post viewing on CMU Crypto Seminar Channel.