Crypto/Applied Crypto Seminar

  • Gates Hillman 7101 and Zoom
  • In Person and Virtual Presentation - ET
  • HAO CHUNG
  • Ph.D. Student
  • Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
  • Carnegie Mellon University
Seminars

(Im)possibility Results for Transaction Fee Mechanism Design

In this talk, I will talk about my recent research result with Elaine Shi.

In short, in blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereums, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a ``dream'' transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed. 

In this work, we prove a new impossibility result: assuming finite block size, no single-parameter, non-trivial, possibly randomized TFM can simultaneously satisfy truthful bidding and miner-user side contract proofness. On the other hand, we also give a relaxed version of the player's utility. In this case, we propose a mechanism that satisfies truthful bidding and miner-user side contract proofness.

Zoom Participation. See announcement. Post viewing on CMU Crypto Seminar Channel.

For More Information, Please Contact: 
Keywords: